Identity-Based Motivation: Implications for Intervention by Oyserman, Daphna & Destin, Mesmin
 http://tcp.sagepub.com/
 
The Counseling Psychologist
 http://tcp.sagepub.com/content/38/7/1001
The online version of this article can be found at:
 
DOI: 10.1177/0011000010374775
 2010 38: 1001The Counseling Psychologist
Daphna Oyserman and Mesmin Destin
Identity-Based Motivation: Implications for Intervention
 
 
Published by:
 http://www.sagepublications.com
On behalf of:
 
 
 Division of Counseling Psychology of the American Psychological Association
 can be found at:The Counseling PsychologistAdditional services and information for 
 
 
 
 
 http://tcp.sagepub.com/cgi/alertsEmail Alerts: 
 
 http://tcp.sagepub.com/subscriptionsSubscriptions: 
 
 http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.navReprints: 
 
 http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.navPermissions: 
 
 http://tcp.sagepub.com/content/38/7/1001.refs.htmlCitations: 
 
 at UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN on September 10, 2010tcp.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Around the Winter Roundtable
The Counseling Psychologist
38(7) 1001 –1043
© 2010 SAGE Publications
Reprints and permission: http://www. 
sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0011000010374775
http://tcp.sagepub.com
Identity-Based 
Motivation: 
Implications for 
Intervention
Daphna Oyserman1
and Mesmin Destin1
Abstract
Children want to succeed academically and attend college but their actual 
attainment often lags behind; some groups (e.g., boys, low-income children) 
are particularly likely to experience this gap. Social structural factors matter, 
influencing this gap in part by affecting children’s perceptions of what is 
possible for them and people like them in the future. Interventions that focus 
on this macro–micro interface can boost children’s attainment. We articulate 
the processes underlying these effects using an integrative culturally sensitive 
framework entitled identity-based motivation (IBM). The IBM model assumes 
that identities are dynamically constructed in context. People interpret 
situations and difficulties in ways that are congruent with currently active 
identities and prefer identity-congruent to identity-incongruent actions. 
When action feels identity congruent, experienced difficulty highlights 
that the behavior is important and meaningful. When action feels identity 
incongruent, the same difficulty suggests that the behavior is pointless and 
“not for people like me.”
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Children want to do well in school and attend college but their actual attainment 
often lags behind their aspirations. This aspiration-attainment gap is a prob-
lem both for the children themselves and for society at large, and it affects 
some groups (e.g., boys, low-income children, African American and Latino 
children) more than others (e.g., Arbona, 2000). Macro-level as well as micro-
level processes contribute to the emergence of this gap (Constantine, Erickson, 
Banks, & Timberlake, 1998). From a macro-level perspective, the aspiration–
attainment gap is a function of social structural differences that are relatively 
impossible to change without large-scale, long-term, and financially intensive 
intervention directed at changing children’s opportunity structures (e.g., Vera 
& Reese, 2000; Walsh, Galassi, Murphy, & Park-Taylor, 2002). However, as 
we outline in this article, a number of studies suggest that another approach is 
possible because social structural factors influence the aspiration–achievement 
gap, in part, through their influence on children’s perceptions of what is pos-
sible for them and people like them in the future (Oyserman, Bybee, & Terry, 
2006; Oyserman, Terry, & Bybee, 2002; Solberg, Howard, Blustein, & 
Close, 2002). Accordingly, interventions that focus on this macro–micro 
interface and emphasize the meaning children make of their possibilities can 
help children overcome the constraints imposed by social structural 
variables.
In this article we outline and test this possibility using as our theoretical 
model identity-based motivation (IBM; Oyserman, 2007, 2009a, 2009b), 
which conceptualizes the underlying processes and guides the development 
of interventions that have been tested in experiments and randomized trials 
in urban public schools (in Detroit and its environs as well as Chicago) as 
well as rural areas in the United States and in international settings including 
France and Israel. The IBM model assumes that the self-concept is multifac-
eted, including many diverse and not well-integrated identity components 
with content that is dynamically constructed in context. People interpret 
situations in ways that are congruent with their currently active identities, 
prefer identity-congruent actions over identity-incongruent ones, and inter-
pret any difficulties they encounter in light of identity-congruence. When 
action feels identity congruent, experienced difficulty in engaging in rele-
vant behaviors simply highlights that the behavior is important and mean-
ingful. Conversely, when action feels identity incongruent, the same 
difficulty suggests that engaging in these behaviors is pointless and “not for 
people like me.” As we demonstrate, these perceptions have important 
downstream effects on engagement in school-focused judgments (e.g., plan-
ning to study), behaviors (including engagement with classroom activities 
and time spent on homework), and outcomes (including standardized test 
scores and grades in school).
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IBM has three core postulates that can be termed action readiness, dynamic 
construction, and interpretation of difficulty. Action readiness is the predic-
tion that identities cue readiness to act and to make sense of the world in terms 
of the norms, values, and behaviors relevant to the identity. However, which 
actions are relevant and what sense to make of situations depends on identity 
content, which itself is dynamically constructed. Dynamic construction is the 
prediction that which identities come to mind, what these identities are taken 
to mean, and therefore, which behaviors are congruent with them are dynami-
cally constructed in context (even though identities feel stable and separate 
from contexts). The third postulate, interpretation of difficulty, is the predic-
tion that when a behavior feels identity congruent difficulties in engaging in 
the behavior will be interpreted as meaning that the behavior is important not 
impossible and, therefore, effort is meaningful, not pointless. Thus, inter-
pretation of difficulty matters because it influences judgment, choice, and 
behavior.
Together these three postulates explain both how it is that identities feel 
stable but are instead malleable and dynamically created in context and why 
school success needs to feel identity congruent. People prefer identity-
congruent to identity-incongruent behaviors and are more likely to use 
identity-congruent than identity-incongruent lenses to interpret their social 
and physical world. We present relevant experimental and randomized clini-
cal trial findings, outline implications of these findings for how we concep-
tualize interventions to improve the lives of at-risk children, and discuss 
implications for basic and applied research.
William James (1890) first articulated a version of these postulates by argu-
ing that the self includes content, motivation, and action tendencies; that social 
contexts matter for who one is in the moment; and that the self is malleable. In 
that sense, the IBM approach is rooted in the earliest psychological formulation 
of self-concept. The novel approach that the IBM model brings is two-fold. 
First, it focuses on predicting when and how aspects of the self-concept matter 
by operationalizing the three core postulates (action readiness, dynamic con-
struction, interpretation of difficulty) in a manner amenable to experimental 
manipulation. Second, it focuses on experimental methodology to test the effi-
cacy of these postulates to predict behavioral outcomes in the moment and to 
form the basis for intervention influencing behaviors over time.
In this article, we demonstrate that the IBM model provides an explanation 
for the gap between desired and attained outcomes, an explication of why 
high-risk contexts may enhance this gap, and a set of mechanisms through 
which children in high-risk contexts can succeed. We base our demonstration 
on evidence from lab and field experiments and randomized clinical trials. 
Taken together, these studies demonstrate that the IBM model provides the 
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basis for what we term small interventions with big effects. We use this 
terminology to emphasize that subtle shifts in context can set in motion impor-
tant changes in children’s outcomes.
For clarity, this article is organized in three sections. In the first section, 
we briefly outline what is meant by identity within and across cultures and 
which identities are likely to matter for engagement with school. In the sec-
ond section, we articulate the IBM model. In the third section, we provide 
examples of the implications of the IBM model for procedural readiness and 
action readiness using relevant research from IBM-based lab studies and ran-
domized clinical trials of the IBM-based intervention (called School-to-
Jobs). We conclude with final comments on the relevance of the IBM model 
to interventions with diverse and multicultural populations, providing a 
bridge to other intervention and theoretical approaches.
What Is Meant by Identity?
Self-concept is a multidimensional cognitive structure made up of multiple 
potentially competing past, present, and future identities (for reviews, see 
Abrams, 1994; Burke, 2003; Cross & Cross, 2007; King & Smith, 2004; 
Oyserman, 2001; Settles, 2004). Identities can be personal, including aspects 
of the self that make one unique, or social, including aspects of the self that 
are rooted in various group memberships. Although identities are best thought 
of as elements of the self, self-concept and identity are sometimes used inter-
changeably in the literature. However, in this article, we discuss identity-based 
motivation rather than self-based motivation for both empirical and theoreti-
cal reasons. First empirically, the literature typically examines the content 
and motivational consequences of specific social (e.g., “I’ll be a college stu-
dent,” “I’ll be a better daughter”) and personal (e.g. “I’ll be successful,” “I’ll 
be smart”) past, current, and possible future identities rather than the past, 
current, or future self as a whole (therefore, we use the term possible identi-
ties rather than possible selves, the more commonly used term; for reviews, 
see Dunkel & Kerpelman, 2006; Oyserman & James, 2009, in press). Second, 
from a theoretical perspective, using the term identity is advantageous 
because it links the identity-based model to a broader set of issues, as we 
articulate next.
First, using the term identity focuses attention on effects of socio-cultural 
context. Identity is the term Erikson (1968) used to describe adolescent iden-
tity development. He argued that children’s identities reflect what seems pos-
sible for oneself in a particular historical, cultural, and sociological time 
period. Reconnecting with this term both facilitates connection to this earlier 
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perspective and highlights that we are conceptualizing identities broadly, 
beyond a Western culture-bound focus on the self as an individual product to 
a broader cultural perspective of the self as a social process consisting of con-
nections and relationships to important others (e.g., Oyserman & Markus, 
1993). Second, using the term identity facilitates bridging psychological and 
sociological literatures and facilitates integration with modern goal theories. 
Psychological studies of current and possible selves mostly refer to particular 
identities rather than the self as a whole so that what a possible self is opera-
tionalized as is often more akin to what we are referring to as a possible 
identity (for a review, see Oyserman & James, in press). The sociological 
literatures based in identity and social identity theories emphasize social and 
personal identities as well as the influence of social contexts for identity con-
tent and function (for reviews, see Hogg & Smith, 2007; Stryker & Burke, 
2000). Third, using the term identity facilitates focus on self-concept as a 
larger, multifaceted structure that includes past, current, and future identities 
(Howard, 2000; Neisser, 1988, 1997; Oyserman, 2001). Thinking of the self 
as composed of multiple, not-well-integrated identities is critical to dynamic 
conceptualizations of the self that take into account the advances in social 
cognition research.
Two important consequences of the large size and minimal integration of 
self-concept in memory have been addressed in the literature (Banaji & 
Prentice, 1994; Greenwald & Banaji, 1989; Markus & Wurf, 1987). First, 
only aspects of self-concept that are in working memory at any point in time 
are likely to influence feelings and actions; second, which aspects of self-
concept are in working memory at any point in time is predicted by the situ-
ation. Important as these insights are, they do not fully address the dynamic 
nature of self-concept. As a consequence of the dynamic nature of self-
concept, what a particular identity means and which actions are congruent 
with it are actively constructed by features of immediate contexts. Thus, 
when contexts make a particular current or possible identity salient, its con-
tent and the behaviors associated with it are likely to be shaped by what 
makes sense in the moment.
People come to know who they are and can become in interactions with 
others in their social contexts. Differing contexts highlight different identi-
ties or sets of traits and characteristics that are perceived as related. Which 
identity is salient in the moment influences both what one pays attention to 
and what one chooses to do.1 Consider an eighth grader whose self-concept, 
sampled across multiple contexts, includes the following identities: “I am a 
girl whose parents are from Mexico. I used to want to play violin. I hate 
school. This coming year, I expect to get As and be really popular. I want to 
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become a doctor. I am afraid I might end up poor, unemployed, or homeless.” 
Imagine that this eighth grader is in her math class and does not understand 
what the teacher is explaining. Depending on which identity constellation is 
salient, she is likely to have a different perspective on what to do and how to 
proceed.
When considered through the lens of the expected “all As” identity, she 
may take notes and copy the problems from the board into her notebook so she 
can stay after class to show the teacher where she got lost or use these notes to 
try to figure things out on her own after school. When considered through 
another lens (e.g., the expected “popular” identity), none of these options may 
come to mind. First, she may not really notice that she is lost because she is 
paying attention to other cues (like who is passing a note to whom). Second, 
even if she notices that nothing on the board makes sense, staying after class 
or working at home may simply not come to mind when the bell rings and 
there are chances to engage in “popular” identity behaviors.
Each identity, being the kind of person who gets all As or is popular, 
involves a set of traits and characteristics which may feel congruent or incon-
gruent with other identities. The traits and characteristics that make up an 
identity may be either individual- or social group–based (Brewer, 1991). 
Thus, getting all A’s may be part of one’s social identity as a Mexican Amer-
ican girl or simply a personal identity. Moreover, contexts may cue current or 
possible future identities and the futures they refer to may be near (e.g., “this 
coming year I will get all As”) or far (e.g., “I will be a doctor when I grow 
up”). These distinctions, between current and possible future identities and 
between personal (also termed individual) and social (also termed relational 
or collective) identities are useful. Research is beginning to provide evidence 
that possible future identities can influence current action when the possible 
future identity feels connected to the current self, whether the possible iden-
tity describes a near (Oyserman et al., 2004) or far (Nurra & Oyserman, 
2010) future. The individual–collection distinction highlights the malleabil-
ity of identity to shift from ways one is unique and different from others, 
connected to specific others, and a part of social groups (e.g., Brewer, 1991; 
Cross & Cross, 2007; Kashima & Hardie, 2000).
However, as detailed in the following sections, traits and characteristics 
can be simultaneously personal and social descriptions of who “I” am. To 
continue with the prior example, the A student identity could feel congruent 
or incongruent with being a girl, being Mexican American, or being a Mexi-
can American girl. If these identities feel congruent, then when racial-ethnic 
identity is salient so are gender and school; conversely, if these identities feel 
incongruent, then when one identity comes to mind the others do not either 
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because they are irrelevant or because being one means that the others cannot 
also be true.
Impact of Gender, Culture, and 
Social Structural Factors on Identity
One of the insights from ecological systems theory (Bronfenbrenner, 1977) 
is that people are embedded in contexts that shape their choices. To specify 
which features of contexts matter, when they matter, and how they matter, it 
is necessary to move beyond the more static predictions coming from an 
ecological systems approach and consider identity, social identity (e.g., Brewer, 
1991; Hogg, Terry, & White, 1995; Strauss & Cross, 2005), and cultural 
psychology theories (e.g., A. P. Fiske, Kitayama, Markus, & Nisbett, 1998). 
For example, Brewer (1991) predicted that people would focus more on what 
makes them distinctive than what makes them similar to others when they are 
in in-group contexts; conversely, they will focus more on what makes them 
similar to in-group members than what makes them distinctive when they are 
in contexts that include in- and out-group members. Thus, what is important 
is the nature of the momentary, here-and-now, immediate situation. Meaning 
within immediate situations is assumed to draw both from what makes sense 
within the broader social context in which the situation occurs (e.g., school, 
the family, the neighborhood) and the cultural-historical epoch within which 
that social context is embedded (for articulation relevant to self and identity, 
see Oyserman & Packer, 1996).
Social identity theorists, in particular, have attempted to understand when 
a variety of social group memberships (e.g., being a man or a woman, Black 
or White) are a salient part of self-concept and when they are not. As articu-
lated by racial-ethnic self-schema theory, social labels such as race, ethnicity, 
gender, and social class are not necessarily elements of identity. People can 
be aschematic for race-ethnicity and other social group memberships 
(Oyserman, Kemmelmeier, Fryberg, Brosh, & Hart-Johnson, 2003). That is, 
although all people can be labeled in terms of memberships in social groups, 
not all social group memberships are included as identity elements. Moreover, 
when a social group is included as an identity element, the content of the iden-
tity depends on the traits and characteristics the person associates with the 
social group (Oyserman et al., 2003). Individuals vary in what that content is 
and this variation predicts outcomes over time (Altschul, Oyserman, & Bybee, 
2006, 2008; Cross & Cross, 2008; Oyserman et al., 2003).
A number of scholars have considered how this works for school-focused 
motivation. If valuing and working hard in school is included in social identity 
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content, then when the identity is salient so is focus on school. Conversely, if 
valuing and working hard in school are not included in social identity content, 
then when the identity is salient school may not come to mind. This may be 
particularly problematic if a stereotype exists about whether people who 
belong to the social group on which the identity is based succeed in school. 
Stereotype threat theory predicts a decrement in performance when member-
ship in such social groups is salient, and supporting evidence is found across 
a variety of social groups, including gender, social class, and race-ethnicity 
(for a review, see Wheeler & Petty, 2001). The identity-based motivation 
model predicts and finds an interaction effect: Stereotypes are threatening 
only if the identity that comes to mind does not include a refutation of the 
stereotype (for school-focused content, see Oyserman et al., 2003; for health-
focused content, see Oyserman, Fryberg, & Yoder, 2007).
The working assumptions are first that social and personal identities come 
to mind when they are relevant in context, not otherwise, and second that 
identities that come to mind shift attention toward behaviors seen as identity 
congruent in context. Consider, for example, an eight year old waiting at the 
bus stop. This third grader is both a boy and a good speller. The boys cluster 
together at the bus stop and separate themselves from the girls. In this situa-
tion, his identity as a boy but not his identity as a good speller is relevant. But 
small changes in situation would influence which identities came to mind 
and therefore what behavior occurred. For example, if all poor spellers want 
homework help before school from the good spellers then poor spellers might 
cluster around good spellers, regardless of gender, so that one’s identity as a 
speller, not as a boy, would be contextually relevant (if the only thing that 
mattered was spelling prowess). But, for example, if poor spellers only 
sought help within gender group, then both gender and spelling would be 
relevant identity cues. Social identity theory does not specify whether con-
texts are likely to make social (e.g., being a boy) or personal (e.g., being a 
good speller) identities salient; rather, it predicts that when an identity is 
salient in context it will matter.
Coming from another angle, cultural psychologists have attempted to 
address the question of whether a social or a personal identity is likely to 
come to mind as a question of cross-societal difference. Cultural psycholo-
gists distinguish cultures in terms of whether they are individualistic or col-
lectivistic, suggesting that there are cross-cultural differences in whether 
people tend to define themselves in terms of personal or social identities. 
Within this literature, when the self-concept is dominated by personal and 
individual-focused identities, it is termed idiocentric (Triandis, 1989) or 
independent (Markus & Kitayama, 1991), and when the self-concept is 
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dominated by social and relational-focused identities, it is termed allocentric 
(Triandis, 1989) or interdependent (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). This sim-
plification does not imply that individuals have only one way of making 
sense of who they are or that in some societies social identities are not part 
of self-concept. Rather, these models predict that societies are likely to dif-
fer in which social identities are chronically salient within the self-concept. 
Specifically, in collectivistic societies, important social identities involve 
groups into which one is born (e.g., race-ethnicity, tribe, or religion); whereas 
in individualistic societies, important social identities involve groups one 
can join or leave at will (e.g., professional or trade groups) (A. P. Fiske 
et al., 1998; Oyserman, 1993; Triandis, 1995). These cultural differences in 
societies are assumed to be based in the society’s history. Individuals social-
ized within different societies are thus assumed to differ because of histori-
cal differences in how each society developed (Nisbett, 2003). In terms of 
identity, cultural psychologists predict that individualistic societies are more 
likely to focus members’ attention on their personal identities, whereas col-
lectivistic societies are more likely to focus members’ attention on their 
social identities.
Because these differences are assumed to be based in differences at the 
societal level, cultural psychologists typically study differences in identity 
content by comparing groups, demonstrating, for example, a higher propor-
tion of individual compared to social identities in working self-concept of 
European American college students compared to college students from 
other countries (for a review, see Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002). 
However, evidence from such between-group or between-society compari-
sons suffers from causal ambiguity because groups and societies differ on 
many characteristics, so it remains unclear whether observed differences are 
due to the posited cause or to one of its numerous natural confounds (for a 
review, see Oyserman & Lee, 2007, 2008a, 2008b). Moreover, these com-
parisons do not provide insight into the dynamic process by which identities 
change within individuals across time. Between-group difference observed at 
a single point in time could be due to differences in a culture as defined by its 
history and institutions or to other reasons that are not so distal or so fixed. In 
particular, more proximate factors in the immediate context may make some 
but not other identities salient at the moment of data collection.
In brief, although many of the theoretically posited between-society differ-
ences assumed to be stably based in individualism and collectivism can be 
found, between-society comparisons cannot illuminate the underlying process 
assumed to produce these differences (for meta-analytic reviews and a discus-
sion of the methodological issues, see Oyserman et al., 2002; Oyserman & 
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Lee, 2008a, 2008b; Oyserman & Uskul, 2008). Experimental approaches that 
prime individualism and collectivism demonstrate that both personal and 
social identities are easily cued, both within the United States and in other 
countries. This implies that societies may differ in two ways. First, as posited 
by theories of individualism and collectivism (e.g., Triandis, 1989), societies 
are likely to differ in the propensity for any particular situation to cue a social 
identity as compared to a personal identity. Second, as outlined in the section 
on situated cognition, societies may also differ in which particular personal or 
social identities are cued and what these identities mean in context.
Which Identities Matter?
Numerous variables, from situational characteristics to experimental primes, 
can render an identity salient and increase its temporary relevance and influ-
ence. Any cued identity can matter when it comes to mind but some identities 
are more likely to be cued across situations or within any given situation 
than are others. Broader identities (e.g., identities based on race, ethnicity or 
gender) are more likely to be cued than are narrower ones (e.g., identities based 
on specific situations such as being in the parent pick-up, walker, or bus rider 
groups at school). Of course individuals differ in which identities are central 
and therefore more likely to be chronically salient, but beyond this individual 
variability what makes an identity broad or narrow is whether it is likely to be 
cued across a variety of contexts. Identities that are important but rarely cued 
in everyday contexts are less likely to influence behaviors than are identities 
that are frequently cued in everyday contexts. Behaviors linked to broader 
identities are more likely to be engaged. Behaviors linked only to narrow iden-
tities are less likely to be engaged. When narrow identities (e.g., college bound) 
are linked with broader identities (e.g., racial-ethnic, social class, or gender 
identities), then contexts that cue one can also cue the other.
Gender and race-ethnicity are both broad social identities that are often 
psychologically salient (for a developmental argument as to why that is the 
case, see Bigler & Liben, 2006; for a social psychological perspective, see 
McGuire, McGuire, Child, & Fujiota, 1978). Psychological salience may 
occur for a number of reasons. First, race-ethnicity and gender are often expe-
rienced as essential and permanent ways of being, so anything connected to 
them is marked (for a gender example, see Prentice & Miller, 2006). Second, 
race-ethnicity and gender are often interpreted by others as having what is 
termed psychological functionality. In other words, people act on knowledge 
of race-ethnicity and gender as if knowing this information allowed for useful 
predictions about someone’s likely behavior or characteristics. Because others 
respond as if these categories are psychologically functional, failing to take 
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these social categories into account as part of identity impedes one’s ability to 
predict other’s response to oneself (Bigler & Liben, 2006). Of course, simply 
including a social category as a social identity does not mean it will influence 
behavior in a particular context. Social identities matter when they come to 
mind, not otherwise (Oyserman et al., 2003).
It should be noted that although it may seem that gender and race-ethnicity 
are more likely to be chronically salient for women and minorities, from an 
IBM perspective, dominant social identities such as being male and majority 
(White) are just as likely to matter when they are cued. A cued identity can 
open or close choice options. Consider the situation of a middle-aged White 
man looking at himself in the mirror during his morning shave. He notices he 
is not looking as young as he used to, his hair is looking grey, and his eyes 
have dark circles. If he were a woman, he could put on make up and get his 
hair colored. As a man, these options might not come to mind, or even if they 
did, he might worry what others would think or say. The notion is that identi-
ties shape the options that come to mind, which choices make sense, and 
which feel awkward. When cued, nondominant social identities (e.g., female, 
of color) may be more likely to limit choices and options that come to mind 
than are dominant social identities (e.g., male, heterosexual), but as our pre-
ceding example highlights, these latter identities can also be choice limiting.
IBM
The identity-based motivation (IBM) model rests on the assumption that iden-
tities matter because they provide a basis for meaning making and for action 
(Oyserman & Markus, 1998). This implies first that people are motivated to 
act in identity-congruent ways and, second, that when a behavior feels identity 
congruent in context, it feels natural, and difficulty in engaging in the behav-
ior is likely to be interpreted as meaning that it is important (e.g., “no pain, no 
gain”; Oyserman, 2007). Moreover, it also implies that the reverse is the case 
for behaviors that do not feel identity congruent in context. These behaviors 
don’t feel natural, and difficulty in engaging in them is likely to be interpreted 
as meaning that the behavior is not identity syntonic (e.g., “taking notes is for 
nerds, not for normal kids like me”) or lead to questioning the identity itself 
(e.g., “maybe I am not a math person”).
As detailed in the following section, from an IBM perspective, both per-
sonal and social identities (whether formulated as current or possible future 
identities) matter not only because they focus attention on certain content—
who one was, is, and may become—but also because in interaction with 
context they evoke identity-congruent behavior and cognitive processes. 
Along with prior theories, the IBM model emphasizes the motivational force 
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of identities. For example, it shares with social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 
1986), self-categorization (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 
1987), and symbolic self-completion (Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1981) theo-
ries the notion that people act to increase felt similarity to salient social iden-
tities, particularly when membership might feel threatened.2 The IBM model 
also shares with cultural psychology (Triandis, 1989, 1995) the notion that 
differences in identity expression reflect differences in the relative salience 
of individual and collective identities, not differences in the existence of such 
identities. The IBM model moves beyond these prior models in a number of 
ways. The IBM model predicts that what an identity means and, therefore, 
what is congruent with it is dynamically constructed in the moment and can 
include both positive and self-undermining or even self-destructive behav-
iors. It also predicts that when behavior feels identity congruent then the 
experience of difficulty in working on the behavior is likely to be interpreted 
as meaning that the behavior is an important part of the process, not an indi-
cation that the behavior is impossible or unnecessary.
In making this case, the IBM model links to modern motivation theories 
and uses a situated social cognition perspective (e.g., Schwarz, 2007, 2010; 
Smith & Semin, 2004, 2007). A situated perspective proposes that cognition 
and action are not separate from contexts but rather are dynamically shaped by 
them. The IBM model integrates cognitive approaches with modern goal the-
ories, which propose that once instantiated goals can be situationally cued 
outside of conscious awareness and without systematic processing (for a 
review, see Fischbach & Fergeson, 2007). On one hand, thinking is flexibly 
focused on the demands of the current situation; on the other hand, thinking is 
framed by subtle situational cues as to what is relevant and what experiences 
mean.
By integrating these perspectives into a unified framework, the IBM model 
illuminates the social and cultural nature of identity, offering novel predic-
tions about identity-based processes and their outcomes (Oyserman, 2007, 
2009a, 2009b). Particularly important is the notion that a salient identity can 
trigger mental processes that guide subsequent perception and action. Making 
an identity salient activates identity-consistent processes that can operate out-
side of awareness and, in effect, sabotage some self-goals while strengthening 
others (e.g., through disengaging from academic performance or from health-
ful lifestyles) (Oyserman et al., 2007).
Identities and Interpretation of Meta-Cognitive Experience
Engaging in identity-congruent behavior is often difficult, requiring persis-
tence over time and forsaking of other potentially enjoyable choices. Consider 
 at UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN on September 10, 2010tcp.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Oyserman and Destin 1013
the behaviors required to attain school-focused identities, such as class work, 
homework, and studying. The activities themselves may feel difficult. Diffi-
culty may imply that the path to the identity is closed, meaning that the 
identity is unlikely to be attained or that it is an awkward fit with other impor-
tant identities and so should be abandoned. To judge what difficulty means, 
children must answer the implied questions, “Why is this so hard for me? Is 
this really the true me? Do we have school-focused identities?” Likewise, 
they must judge whether particular behavioral patterns (e.g., asking for help) 
are likely to work and if they contradict in-group identity (e.g., “Will asking 
the teacher for help actually help me succeed in school or is it only something 
that girls do or just a ‘White’ thing to do?”). If the path to an identity is 
blocked, no matter what one does, the identity will not be attained. If the 
behavior feels incongruent with other important identities, it may not come 
to mind in the first place.
Thus, feelings of ease and difficulty are not separate from identity; rather, 
they are integral to identity and influence whether an identity is pursued or 
abandoned. This formulation of identity as including both content (what one 
thinks about when one thinks about one’s self) and interpretation of accom-
panying meta-cognitive process (reflection on how thinking feels) first 
appeared in the writing of William James (1890). More recently, social cog-
nition research has demonstrated the importance of considering both the con-
tent of thoughts and the meaning attributed to feelings of ease or difficulty 
associated with these thoughts (see Schwarz, 1998, 2002). Images of oneself 
having current and future identities are inextricably linked with feelings of 
ease or difficulty, and what these feelings mean depends on the question one 
asks oneself in regards to the feeling. If the question is “Is this important to 
me?” then experienced difficulty may be interpreted as meaning that the 
answer is “Yes, this is important to me. Otherwise, why am I working so 
hard?” Conversely, if the question is “Is this the real me?” then experienced 
difficulty may be interpreted as meaning that the answer is “no” because feel-
ings of ease are commonly interpreted as truth and genuineness. (Other inter-
pretations of felt difficulty are that if it is hard to think of or hard to do it is 
less likely to be true; Higgins, 1998; Schwarz & Bless, 1992; Schwarz & 
Clore, 1996.)
How the meta-cognitive experience of ease or difficulty is interpreted 
when bringing to mind an identity matters. First, it can provide the basis for 
inferring both whether a current or possible identity (e.g., an “A student”) is a 
part of the self and so worth pursuing or is only falsely assumed to be a part of 
the self but actually conflicting with other important identities and so not 
worth pursuing. Second, it can provide feedback as to whether the gap between 
a current and a desired identity is manageable or unmanageable, open or 
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blocked, and therefore, whether the desired identity should be pursued or 
simply abandoned. Successful movement toward a school-focused identity 
requires ongoing behavior; it is not enough to complete one homework assign-
ment or stay after class one day. If one’s meta-cognitive experience is that 
working on the identity is difficult and if this difficulty is interpreted with a 
naïve theory that difficulty means it is not the real me, then difficulties associ-
ated with working toward the identity will undermine both effort and belief 
that the identity is truly part of the self.
Although the experience of meta-cognitive difficulty is generally inter-
preted as meaning “not true for me,” a number of studies have documented 
that other interpretations are possible (Rothman & Schwarz, 1998). Sports 
stories abound with reinterpretation of the meaning of experienced difficulty 
(e.g., “no pain, no gain”) and the need to keep trying (e.g., “you miss 100% of 
the shots you don’t take”). Similarly, when attempting to attain a school-
focused identity, the meta-cognitive experience of difficulty is generally inter-
preted as “not the true me,” but could be reinterpreted to mean other things. 
Difficulty can be viewed as a normative part of the process (e.g., “success is 
1% inspiration and 99% perspiration”). Difficulty can also provide evidence 
of progress (e.g., “the important things in life are the ones you really have to 
work for”). If difficulty and failures along the way are viewed as critical to 
eventual success, then difficulty is evidence of striving.
The common interpretation of difficulty as meaning low ability fits well 
with Americans’ belief that intelligence and many other abilities are fixed 
rather than malleable (Dweck, 2002; Hong, Chiu, & Dweck, 1995). For effort 
to matter, one must believe that ability is malleable and can be incrementally 
improved rather than believe that it is a stable trait or entity (Dweck, 2002; 
Hong et al., 1995). Students holding incremental theories are more likely to 
persist over time (Butler, 2000, Study 1), as do students convinced to hold an 
incremental theory (Butler, 2000, Study 2). The identity-based motivation 
model provides a framework within which to understand entity and incremen-
tal formulations as naïve theories explaining what difficulty means. If effort 
matters (incremental theory of ability), then difficulty is likely to be inter-
preted as meaning that more effort is needed. However, if effort does not mat-
ter (an entity theory of ability), then difficulty is likely to be interpreted as 
meaning that ability is lacking so effort should be suspended.
Although race and gender have not been used to predict entity and incre-
mental theories about ability, some race and gender differences have been 
found. For example, in one college sample, European American and female 
students were more likely to report entity beliefs about athletic abilities 
than were African American and male college students (Li, Harrison, & 
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Solmon, 2004). In a sample of second graders, boys and girls were asked to 
explain the misbehavior of same-gender children. Boys commonly described 
boys’ misbehavior in trait terms (e.g., “he is a bad boy”), whereas girls almost 
never used trait terms to describe the misbehavior of girls, relying instead on 
situational explanations (Heyman & Dweck, 1998). It is possible that in 
domains in which effort is expended and change has been observed individu-
als are more likely to learn to appreciate incremental theories, whereas in 
domains stereotyped as identity incongruent, they may be more at risk of 
accepting an entity theory with the implication that “we just can’t behave 
differently.”
Identity-Based Motivation Is Socially Situated Cognition
The premise of an identity-based motivation perspective is that people use 
identities to prepare for action and to make sense of the world around them. 
That is, thinking (about identity) is for doing—an insight that can be dated 
back at least to William James (1890). More recent key formulations of this 
theme come from Smith and Semin’s (2004, 2007) situated social cognition 
model, S. Fiske’s (1992) thinking-is-for-doing formulation of the situatedness 
of social cognition, Schwarz’s (2007, 2010) situational sensitivity formulation 
of social judgment, and theories of racial and ethnic identity including Strauss 
and Cross’s (2005) descriptions of context-sensitive identity enactments 
among African Americans. Although they are varied, each of these formula-
tions highlights the constructive nature of cognition and underscores that 
individuals are sensitive to meaningful features of the environment and adjust 
thinking and doing to what is contextually relevant (S. Fiske, 1992).
In this way, the IBM model builds on the recurrent social psychological 
theme that cognition is situated and pragmatic. Situated and social perspec-
tives call attention to the fact that contexts in which one thinks influence both 
what comes to mind and how one makes sense of what comes to mind. Think-
ing is contextualized by social and nonsocial features of contexts, including 
the pragmatics of the task at hand and one’s physical experiences in the con-
text (Smith & Semin, 2004).
Taken together, situated cognition approaches suggest a few basic prem-
ises: (a) Thinking is situated; (b) the impact of contexts on thinking does not 
depend on conscious awareness of the context or its impact; and (c) people 
think to engage in adaptive action. Thinking is influenced by the context in 
which it occurs, including physical and social features of the external context 
as well as the experience of thinking itself. This means that thinking is not 
invariant and context free; people think flexibly and are responsive to the 
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immediate environment. The context sensitivity highlighted by situated 
approaches does not depend on conscious awareness of the impact of psycho-
logically meaningful features of situations on cognition. Not only do situa-
tional effects not require explicit justification, but drawing attention to the 
potential influence of context can change the response (e.g., S. Fiske, 1992; 
Schwarz, 2010).
To be sure, situated and social cognition approaches do not propose that 
all context effects on cognitive processes are necessarily mediated by self-
concept or identity (e.g., Smith & Semin, 2004). However, a situated frame-
work is critical to understanding IBM. The IBM model proposes that people 
are motivated to act in ways and make sense of the world using procedures 
congruent with their identities. Because identities are situated, which identi-
ties come to mind and what they mean in context is a function of both chronic 
and situational cues. Some situations are more likely to cue particular identi-
ties or constellations of identities than are others. People’s interpretation of 
cued identities (or identity constellations) depends on the pragmatic meaning 
of these identities in the particular context; action and procedural readiness 
will be cued but also shaped by the affordances of the context.
When situations cue an identity (e.g., African American), what the cued 
identity carries with it is not a fixed list of traits (e.g., hardworking, persis-
tent). Rather, the cued identity carries with it a general readiness to act and 
make sense of the world in identity-congruent terms, including the norms, 
values, strategies and goals associated with that identity as well as the cogni-
tive procedures relevant to it. What exactly this readiness looks like is depen-
dent on what the cued identity comes to mean in the particular context in 
which it is cued. This does not imply that identities do not predict behaviors 
over time but, rather, that the predictive power of an identity depends on the 
stability of the contexts in which it is cued because differing contexts cue 
different aspects of an identity and differing intersections with other identi-
ties. The effect of an identity will be stable over time to the extent that indi-
viduals repeatedly encounter psychologically isomorphic situations because 
in each instance the situation will engender readiness to take the same actions 
(for a related discussion of the stability of attitudes, see Schwarz, 2007; for 
examples of behavior, see Strauss & Cross, 2005, diary data). Once a choice 
becomes identity linked, it is automatized. If it feels identity syntonic, it feels 
right and does not require further reflection. On the other hand, if it feels 
nonsyntonic to identity, it feels wrong and this feeling also does not invite 
further reflection.
The impact of subtle differences in context on which actions are cued by 
an identity is demonstrated by comparing the behavioral choices of 
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eighth-grade students given a chance to complete an extra credit assignment 
in two slightly different contexts (Destin & Oyserman, 2010). Their contexts 
differed because, unbeknownst to them, they were randomly assigned to 
either an education-dependent or an education-independent identity context. 
In the education-independent context, students learned how much money 
top entertainers and athletes make compared to the average person in their 
state. In the education-dependent context, students learned how much money 
on average people in their state earned after attaining various education lev-
els. Students were then asked how much they would study that night. Those 
in the education-dependent context said they would study more than did 
those in the education-independent context. Even more impressive, eight 
times as many students went home and completed an extra credit assignment 
offered by an instructor. We conclude that although both the education-inde-
pendent and the education-dependent contexts made possible adult identities 
salient, only in the education-dependent context did possible adult identities 
include school-focused behaviors. In this context, but not in the education-
independent one, becoming an adult involved schoolwork. Therefore, these 
children were more likely to plan and engage in schoolwork.
Just as in the above example, in everyday life, identity-based motivation is 
common. It is cued when an identity is cued by psychologically meaningful 
features of everyday situations, like the features that tell the participant what 
the situation is about. Because thinking is for doing and is a dynamic product 
of the constraints and affordances of the immediate context, the particular 
identity cued in a particular context is a function of what is psychologically 
meaningful in context, what is chronically salient or central to the individual, 
and what the situational action potentials are. Although identities feel stable, 
they are better conceptualized as dynamically created and recreated in each 
situation in which they are evoked. Because thinking is for doing and thinking 
is the emergent outcome of a dynamic process, contextual cues determine, at 
least in part, not only whether a particular identity will be cued but also how a 
cued identity will be interpreted and, therefore, which procedures, behaviors, 
choices, and motivations are primed. Although they emerge in a dynamic 
interaction with context, cued identities are consequential for subsequent 
meaning making, including which cognitive procedures are brought to bear 
(for a review of experimental evidence across national cultures, see Oyserman & 
Lee, 2007, 2008a, 2008b; Oyserman, Sorensen, Reber, & Chen, 2009) and 
which actions are taken (for examples in elementary and middle schools, see 
Destin & Oyserman, 2010; Elmore & Oyserman, 2010; Nurra & Oyserman, 
2010; for examples in college and beyond, see Cross, Smith & Payne, 2002; 
Strauss & Cross, 2005).
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Contexts May Not Cue Identity-Based Motivation Toward School
Most children desire school success and imagine that they will become col-
lege bound (Mello, 2009; Trusty, 2000). Unfortunately, expectations are a 
better predictor of grades for socioeconomically advantaged than for socioeco-
nomically disadvantaged children (Alexander & Entwisle, 1988; Alexander, 
Entwisle, & Bedinger, 1994). Indeed, in our own research in low-income 
urban schools, almost all students (close to 90%) reported expecting to attend 
college but only about half described education-dependent adult possible 
identities (Destin & Oyserman, 2010, Study 1).
An identity-based motivation perspective articulates how this gap occurs. 
Although low-income and minority children desire becoming school suc-
cesses and want to avoid becoming school failures, they are unlikely to focus 
sustained effort on school unless contexts support these identities. First, self-
relevant goals about school must come to mind in context. Second, these self-
relevant goals must feel congruent with other important aspects of identity 
(e.g., racial-ethnic, gender, and social-class relevant identities). Third, diffi-
culties along the way must be interpreted as meaning that a school-focused 
future is important, not impossible, and that the path to attaining the self-
relevant future goal is open, not closed (Oyserman, Bybee, et al., 2006).
For a number of reasons, these basic conditions for identity-based motiva-
tion to support school-focused effort are less likely to be met when children 
grow up in neighborhoods with high unemployment and poverty and limited 
exposure to adults like themselves who are college graduates. Low-income and 
minority children are more likely to live in high-unemployment and high-
poverty neighborhoods (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2009). These neighbor-
hoods also have a number of other problematic characteristics. First, they are 
likely to be segregated, and segregation is associated both with limited expo-
sure to adults who are college graduates (Adelman & Gocker, 2007; Krivo, 
Peterson, Rizzo, & Reynolds, 1998) and with lower endorsement of those 
aspects of racial-ethnic identity predictive of academic attainment (termed con-
nectedness, awareness of racism, and embedded achievement; Oyserman & 
Yoon, 2009). Second, these contexts are likely to be media saturated, providing 
vivid models of education-independent adult identities such as those in sports 
and entertainment (Roberts, 2000). Given the lack of easily accessible models 
of people “like me” who have succeeded in school, youths’ commitments to 
education may remain abstract and rarely cued as part of identity, thus seldom 
linked to everyday behaviors (for a qualitative description, see Roderick, 2003; 
for quantitative analyses, see Oyserman, Johnson, & James, in press).
Moreover, in these contexts, racial-ethnic identities may also include 
information about academics that undermines children’s belief in the identity 
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congruence of school-focused effort. Studies using a variety of methods con-
verge in suggesting that students’ perceptions of racial-ethnic groups contain 
predictions about their academic behaviors. Kao’s (2000) ethnographic 
research suggests that high school students perceive Latinos as more likely to 
become manual laborers, Asians to do well in school, and African Americans 
to do poorly in school. Hudley and Graham (2001) showed a similar pattern 
of results in a scenario-based experimental paradigm. Latino and African 
American students presented with a scenario about a target student who is 
failing in school were more likely to predict that the target was Latino or 
African American than White. These results were replicated when low-
income children were asked to infer the performance of a target student. 
When asked to predict academic performance of a target student, low-income 
students infer worse performance from low (vs. middle) social class peers 
(Régner, Huguet, & Monteil, 2002; Weinger, 2000). However, as we docu-
ment next, the consequences of salient racial-ethnic identity depend on what 
it means in context.
Consequences of IBM
In this section, we present evidence for the powerful consequences of IBM 
on readiness to make sense and take action, what we term procedural readi-
ness and action readiness. We demonstrate that procedures and behavior that 
feel identity congruent will be chosen regardless of whether they are the best 
or most effective procedures and behaviors and whether they would have 
been chosen had they not been contextually cued. We focus on how feelings 
of identity fit matter and the things people do or avoid doing because of fit or 
misfit with important identities. As the following studies illustrate, one 
important variable triggering IBM is whether the situation brings an identity 
to mind. Situations can bring identities to mind in different ways, ranging 
from explicit priming to the identity’s distinctiveness in a particular situation 
to concerns that the identity may not be validated in the context. We begin 
first with procedural readiness, demonstrating that cuing individual or collec-
tive mindsets matters for the cognitive procedures brought to mind in the 
moments. We then move to action readiness, demonstrating effects on aca-
demic outcomes both in field experiments and in intervention research.
IBM and Procedural Readiness
In this section, the following proposition is considered: When a specific per-
sonal or social identity is cued in context, what is cued is not simply content 
but also a way of thinking, or a procedure. Having a relational or embedded 
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sense of self cues generally relational and connected information processing 
with a focus on patterns, connections, and relationships. Conversely, having 
an autonomous and separated sense of self cues a different information-
processing style. In this case, separating and pulling procedures are cued and 
the focus is on figure, main point, and central aspects.
Two basic procedures are considered: procedures of pulling apart and 
separating and procedures of connecting and relating. The idea is that what 
comes to mind when an identity is cued is not simply content but also a gen-
eral way of making sense of the world. Because personal identities focus 
attention on traits and characteristics separate from relationships, the proce-
dure cued would be to ignore background and details and focus only on a 
main point. Because social identities focus attention on relationships, with 
traits and characteristics having meaning only within the context of relation-
ships, the procedure cued would be to pay attention to background and details 
and focus on connection. This proposition builds on prior description of 
gender-, racial-ethnic-, and culture-based differences in the propensity to 
define the self as a set of personal identities separated from contexts, rela-
tionships, and group memberships or as a set of social identities embedded in 
contexts, relationships, and group memberships (Coon & Kemmelmeier, 
2001; Markus & Oyserman, 1989; Triandis, 1989; Woike, 1994).
Everyone has both personal and social identities but there is some evi-
dence of chronic between-group differences in the propensity to focus on the 
personal or the social. Markus and Oyserman (1989) reviewed and synthe-
sized the extant literature on gender differences in mathematical and spatial 
abilities. Men and women, they found, differed in how they navigated and 
made sense of three-dimensional space. Men were more likely to report men-
tal imagery separated from their own perspective, seeing the world as the 
crow flies rather than as they traversed it. These gender differences mapped 
onto differences in tasks that involved rotation of objects in three-dimensional 
space.
Markus and Oyserman (1989) proposed that basic differences in how the 
self is organized could predict these effects. Although both men and women 
can have social identities based in gender, men and women may differ in the 
propensity to use social and relational information. Men were more likely to 
define the self as separated from contexts and relationships, and women more 
likely to define the self as embedded in contexts and relationships. These dif-
ferences in content should also have implications for which cognitive proce-
dures are accessible when the self is salient.
Whereas Markus and Oyserman’s (1989) argument was based on a review 
of the gender literature on cognitive style, subsequent focus shifted to 
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cross-national differences arguing for cultural differences in personal versus 
social focus of self-concept (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). At the same time, 
cross-national differences in judgment and decision making were also emerg-
ing that seemed to parallel these differences in self-concept focus (for a 
review, see Oyserman et al., 2002). Just as personal identities focus on the 
self as separate, European Americans seem to focus on the figure and ignore 
background in processing visual information generally, whereas Chinese 
(Nisbett, 2003) and Japanese (Kitayama, Duffy, Kawamura, & Larsen, 2003) 
people seem to focus on the relationship between figure and background, 
congruent with a social identity focus on the self as connected and related.
Clearly, these results are provocative. However, showing between-coun-
try or between-gender differences in average cognitive style does not yet clar-
ify the process underlying these differences. Effects may be due to the 
postulated (fixed) cultural or gender differences, to other gender or culture-
related factors, or to other differences entirely, including more malleable pro-
cesses (see Oyserman & Lee, 2007, 2008a, 2008b, for a discussion). Thus, 
between-group comparisons cannot provide causal evidence about process. To 
demonstrate causal process, two steps are needed. The first step is to demon-
strate that subtle situational cues shift self-concept focus. The second step is to 
demonstrate that shift in self-concept focus results in shifts in the procedures 
that distinguish gender and other groups used in East–West comparisons.
Triandis and his colleagues (Triandis, 1989; Trafimow, Triandis, & Goto, 
1991) provided an initial demonstration that average between-society differ-
ences in self-concept focus could be the result of situational cues. They dem-
onstrated that they could reliably predict whether people would use more 
personal or social identities to describe themselves by shifting their in-the-
moment focus on themselves as similar to or different from friends and fam-
ily. They also showed that once a personal or social identity focus was cued 
in one situation, it was likely to be used again in another situation. They pro-
posed that cross-national differences in self-concept focus were due to situ-
ational cues. In the past 20 years, this basic finding has been replicated using 
a variety of situational cues, showing that people in the East and the West 
describe themselves using more or fewer social identities depending on 
which is cued in situation (for a review, Oyserman & Lee, 2008a, 2008b). 
Taken together, the evidence is clear that situational cues influence whether 
a social or personal identity is salient.
In a series of experiments, Oyserman, Sorensen, Reber, and Chen (2009) 
demonstrated that the same kinds of situational cues that make salient social 
versus personal identities also trigger the cognitive procedures that parallel 
cross-national differences in whether a focal target or integrated whole is first 
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perceived. They showed that the performance of participants from a variety 
of racial-ethnic and national groups (including African Americans, Asian 
Americans, European Americans, Koreans, Hong Kong Chinese, and 
Norwegians) was systematically influenced by whether an individual or a col-
lective mindset was cued. They primed mindset by having participants read a 
paragraph and to mark the pronouns in it. To prime an individual mindset, the 
pronouns were first person singular (I, me, my). To prime a collective mind-
set, the pronouns were first person plural (we, our, us). They found differences 
in basic perception tasks testing hearing, vision, and memory.
When primed with an individual mindset, participants were better at tasks 
that required focus on one piece of information while ignoring other pieces 
of information. When primed with a collective mindset, participants were 
better at tasks that required remembering how information connected and 
related. Those primed with collective mindset were better at incidental recall 
of details including details they had been explicitly told to ignore. For exam-
ple, in one task, those primed with a collective mindset were better able to 
recall information about the context in which a figure to which they were 
supposed to be paying attention was embedded. Similarly, in another task, 
those primed with collective mindset were better able to recall information 
about the placement of figures on a page. These effects are striking because 
in both tasks instructions did not direct them to look at context and those 
primed with an individual mindset were more context blind.
Most relevant to the current focus, performance on a task using Graduate 
Record Exam items improved 10 to 15% after individual-mindset priming. 
These effects were found whether participants were African American, Asian 
American, or European American. Positive effects were particularly dra-
matic when comparing individual mindset–primed participants to collective 
mindset–primed participants, with control group participants between the 
two primes. The experimental task used verbal Graduate Record Exam ques-
tions (e.g., synonyms and antonyms). Accuracy was facilitated by an indi-
vidual mindset and undermined by a collective mindset because the individual 
mindset cued the task-congruent procedure of pulling out the essential mean-
ing and moving along rather than the task-incongruent procedure of consid-
ering how all of the words might connect and meanings might be integrated. 
Mindset was equally malleable in all three groups. We interpret these results 
as suggesting that when an individual mindset is advertently or inadvertently 
cued in these kinds of test situations, performance should improve. Conversely, 
if a collective mindset is inadvertently cued in these kinds of test situations, 
performance should suffer.
Note that the implication is not that a particular mindset is always better or 
worse but, rather, that fit between task and mindset matters and that a mindset, 
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although easily cued, can have effects that can last through at least a test-
taking event. For example, in another series of studies, Lee and colleagues 
(Lee, Oyserman, & Bond, 2010) randomly assigned students to either indi-
vidual- or collective-mindset conditions. Students were then given a difficult 
math test and told their results. Given feedback that they had done poorly, all 
students reported feeling badly, but only those who were primed with an indi-
vidual mindset also disengaged from higher performing peers.
Taken together, these studies indicate that individual and collective mind-
sets are associated with and facilitate the application of different cognitive 
procedures. An individual mindset is associated with procedures that facili-
tate focus on an isolated stimulus and its unique attributes, pulling the stimu-
lus apart from the field. In contrast, a collective mindset is associated with 
procedures that facilitate the identification of relationships, emphasizing the 
embeddedness of a stimulus in its field. Importantly, these mindsets can be 
easily cued by subtle situational influences and are equally influential among 
European American, African American, and Asian American participants 
(as well as participants from other countries in the East and West).
These results are clearly not compatible with an argument that differences 
in cognitive procedures are based in extensive socialization in the intellectual 
traditions of a culture (Nisbett, 2003). Rather, they suggest that differences in 
the spontaneous application of cognitive procedures are better portrayed as 
efficient responses to culturally dominant tasks, consistent with theories of 
situated cognition (for a more detailed discussion, see Oyserman & Lee, 
2007; Oyserman & Sorensen, 2009). Of course these effects are not necessar-
ily mediated by a shift in focus from social to personal identity. Indeed, indi-
vidual and collective mindsets can be primed directly, not only via salient 
identities. However, an IBM model implies that when a social or personal 
identity is cued these effects are also likely because identities carry with them 
procedural readiness, readiness to make sense of the world using an individ-
ual or collective mindset. Whereas this section has focused on effects on 
cognitive procedures generally, in the next section we consider how cued 
identities can influence academic behavior directly.
Identity-Based Motivation and Action 
Readiness: Experimental Evidence
Identities matter for academic outcomes (for examples based on the stereotype-
threat model, see Steele, 1997). When a particular social identity is made 
salient, performance declines if the social group associated with the identity 
(e.g., women) is stereotyped as not performing well in the academic domain 
of interest (e.g., math) and improves if the social group associated with the 
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identity (e.g., Asian) is positively stereotyped as doing well (Shih, Pittinsky, & 
Ambady, 1999; for a review, see Wheeler & Petty, 2001). Thus, in an elegant 
set of studies, Shih and her colleagues (1999) demonstrated each of these 
points. They showed the predicted negative effect of making gender salient 
before women completed the math task, interpreting this result as being due to 
the negative stereotype about women and math. They also showed that when 
another identity (Asian heritage) was made salient, performance rose when the 
data were collected in the United States (Americans positively stereotype 
Asians as math whizzes) but remained stable when the data were collected in 
Canada (Canadians do not have a stereotype about Asians as math whizzes).
Although an implication of a stereotype threat model is that these effects 
are independent of identity content, an IBM perspective focuses attention on 
the processes underlying these effects. For example, in some situations, iden-
tities feel safely supported and accepted by others (Davies, Spencer, & Steele, 
2005; Markus, Steele, & Steele, 2001). In other situations, the legitimacy of 
one’s claim to an identity may be questioned. Situations in which an identity 
is accepted cue identity-based motivation to attain identity-congruent goals. 
Situations in which identity is questioned cue identity-based motivation to 
demonstrate identity fit.
One set of studies assessed students’ feelings of social acceptance, 
obtained teacher ratings of their classroom behavior, and school-reported 
end-of-term grades, comparing racial-ethnic minority students who self-
reported that they did or did not look like members of their racial-ethnic 
group (Oyserman, Brickman, et al., 2006, Studies 1 and 2). The classroom 
context does not afford many ways to engage in behaviors that are consistent 
with particular social identities. Therefore, we predicted that students whose 
racial-ethnic identities felt challenged because they did not look like in-group 
members would be more likely to engage in academic stereotype-confirming 
behaviors. Results supported this prediction. Youth who did not look like 
in-group members were more likely to enact an in-group identity by engag-
ing in stereotype-consistent academic behavior; they underperformed aca-
demically, misbehaved in class, and chose non-school-focused friendships. 
These results suggest that identity-based motivation can have negative effects 
when the options for identify-confirming action are limited to dysfunctional 
behaviors. When belongingness to an important group is threatened, people 
use the situationally available means to mark their identities even when this 
means poor performance and adverse personal outcomes.
However, an identity-based perspective does not suggest simply that peo-
ple are prone to self-stereotype. Rather, it holds that identities influence 
behavior by providing information about group norms and expectations and 
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by shaping a person’s interpretation of social and contextual feedback 
(Oyserman, 2007). Hence, identity-based motivation can have both positive 
and negative affects on behavior. Individuals may confirm or disconfirm 
negative or positive stereotypes depending on how identity is dynamically 
constructed in the moment.
For example, in one study, students completed a math task before or after 
being reminded of their racial or ethnic group membership (Oyserman et al., 
2003, Studies 1 and 2). Being reminded of group membership improved or 
undermined math performance depending on content of racial-ethnic iden-
tity. Performance improved for students with dual identities who saw them-
selves as members of both their racial-ethnic in-group and broader society. In 
contrast, performance declined for students with in-group-only identities 
who saw themselves only as members of their racial-ethnic in-group and not 
of broader society, presumably because in this latter group school success 
was assumed to be excluded from in-group identity.
The same pattern of effects was also found in another sample of youth 
who were followed over the course of the school year. Content of racial-
ethnic identity predicted grade point average over time, presumably because 
the same content was repeatedly cued over the course of the school year. 
Dual racial-ethnic identity content predicted improved performance over 
the course of the school year compared to in-group-only content, which 
predicted decline. Effects were stable, even controlling for prior report card 
scores (Oyserman et al., 2003, Study 3).
The same pattern of effects was found in a sample of youth followed for 
4 years from 9th to 12th grades. Dual identities predicted improved perfor-
mance compared to in-group-only identities, presumably because doing well 
in school was seen as an identity-relevant goal for the former but not the lat-
ter students (Oyserman, 2008). To directly test this effect, Oyserman, Gant 
and Ager (1995, Study 2) reminded students of their racial-ethnic identity 
either before or after taking a math test. When reminded of their racial-ethnic 
identity, African American students persisted more at math tasks if they 
believed that doing well in school was part of racial-ethnic identity. The same 
effect was also found for gender identity (Elmore & Oyserman, in press). In 
this study, children were randomly assigned to either learn accurate informa-
tion about high school graduation rates or median income in their state and to 
learn this information either without gender information (control conditions) 
or separately by gender. Since men earn more, in the condition in which 
median income was presented separately for men and women, the implica-
tion was “boys succeed.” Conversely, since women are more likely to gradu-
ate high school, in the condition in which graduation rate was presented 
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separately for men and women, the implication was “girls succeed.” As 
expected in the gender congruent success conditions (income for boys and 
graduation for girls), children described more school-focused possible selves, 
believed they would go farther in school and earn more than the average 
American, and at trend level, worked harder on an in-class math task.
Moreover, beyond content of racial-ethnic or gender identity, action readi-
ness entails interpretation of meta-cognitive experience of difficulty. If the 
path to attaining school-focused future identities feels open, difficulty is more 
likely to be interpreted as meaning that the outcome is important, increasing 
effort. Conversely, if the path to attain these identities feels closed, then dif-
ficulty is more likely to be interpreted as meaning that the outcome is impos-
sible and not identity congruent. To demonstrate this effect, we randomly 
assigned low-income African American and Latino middle school students to 
receive either information about need-based financial aid or information about 
the cost of college and then asked them about their plans for homework that 
night. We found that children primed to see the path as open (need-based 
financial aid) planned to spend more time on studying and homework than did 
children primed to see the path as closed (cost of college) (Destin & Oyser-
man, 2009). Results were replicated in two schools in two cities and were 
found controlling for current school grades.
We draw two conclusions from the results of these studies. First, salient 
identities matter; second, what these identities mean is malleable and can be 
influenced by situational cues. A limitation of these studies is that they 
either demonstrate effects of identity over time (e.g., Oyserman, 2008) or 
demonstrate effects of contextual manipulation on what identity means 
(e.g., Destin & Oyserman, 2010), but do not demonstrate the effectiveness 
of the contextual manipulation of what identity means over time. As sum-
marized next, this limitation was addressed by translating the identity-based 
motivation model into school-based intervention and demonstrating real 
effects over time on grades, behavior, attendance, and other important out-
comes (Oyserman, Bybee, et al., 2006; Oyserman, Terry, & Bybee, 2002).
IBM and Action Readiness: Evidence 
From a Randomized Clinical Trial
To demonstrate that the IBM model could be used to produce lasting posi-
tive change in school outcomes among children at risk of school problems, 
Oyserman and her colleagues developed and tested the School-to-Jobs inter-
vention (STJ) to change children’s possible identities with three primary 
goals: (a) making the future self feel connected to the current self so that 
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current action to attain the future self is needed; (b) making actions needed 
to attain the future self feel congruent with important gender, race-ethnicity, 
and social class–relevant social identities; and finally (c) providing an inter-
pretation of the experience of difficulty in working on school tasks as 
meaning that school-focused future identities were important, not impossi-
ble, and that failures along the way are normative, not diagnostic. The 
intervention involved structured activities that took place in small groups. 
As described next, each activity was linked to a core postulate of the IBM 
model (action readiness, dynamic construction, and interpretation of diffi-
culty). Activities were ordered in a stepwise fashion, moving from the distal 
to the proximal future and from easy to harder tasks. Intervention was brief, 
lasting only 7 weeks, but effects were long lasting, continuing through the 
2-year follow-up.
Session-by-session synopsis of the intervention. Session 1 focused on making 
possible identities salient and relevant to important social identities: Youth 
were partnered and each introduced the other in terms of the skills or ability 
the partner possessed to successfully complete the school year (e.g., well 
organized, positive attitude). This provided an initial example of congruence 
between school-focused possible identities and important social identities. 
Because all youth engaged in the task, the meta-message was “We all care 
about school.”
Session 2 focused on adult possible identities. Youth picked photographs 
that fit their adult visions. All participated. This participation itself was the 
first meta-message: “Everyone has possible identities. No social identity 
group is excluded.” Most youth chose images of material success. Thus, the 
second meta-message was “We all want a good future.”
Session 3 focused on models. Students drew role models and negative 
forces: people or things that provide energy to work toward possible identi-
ties and those that are draining or nay saying. The meta-message was “Every-
one faces obstacles and difficulties, but this does not make the possible 
identities less part of the ‘true’ self.”
Session 4 focused on bringing the future nearer and making sense of the 
experience of difficulty. Students drew timelines into the future, including 
forks in the road and obstacles. The meta-messages were, first, “The future 
starts now,” and second, “Everyone has difficulties. Failures and setbacks are 
a normal part of timelines and do not mean that possible identities are not part 
of the true self.”
Sessions 5 through 7 focused on strategies. In Session 5, students chose a 
possible identity and articulated specific strategies to attain this identity. This 
proved difficult for each student, and the normative nature of difficulty was 
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the meta-message. In Sessions 6 and 7, students worked on a poster board. In 
Session 6, students chose stickers describing next year’s negative feared and 
positive expected possible identities and put them on the left third of the 
poster board. Then they chose stickers describing their current strategies to 
work on these possible identities and put them in the middle third of the 
poster board. In Session 7 they completed the poster board, filling in the right 
third of the poster board with adult possible identities and linking these with 
lines to current strategies. The final board showed paths from near to far 
future identities via current strategies.
Sessions 8 through 10 focused on interpreting the experience of difficulty. 
Students worked in smaller groups on everyday problems, including social 
problems, academic problems, and the process of getting to high school grad-
uation. The meta-theme was that all students care about these issues, that 
difficulties along the way are normative. This interpretation of difficulty 
implies that school-focused identities are important, not impossible. Session 
11 cemented these new meta-cognitive interpretations by having participants 
review and critique the sessions.
Evaluation procedure. The efficacy of STJ was tested in two separate evalu-
ations: first as an after-school program (Oyserman et al., 2002) and then as an 
in-school program (Oyserman, Bybee, et al., 2006). In both cases, participat-
ing schools drew students from high-poverty and high-unemployment neigh-
borhoods and enrolled predominantly African American and Latino children. 
In both cases, evaluation compared treatment and control children and 
obtained data from multiple sources (self-report, teacher report, school 
records). The after-school program involved randomization of children whose 
parents signed up for the program to participate or not. The in-school program 
involved randomization of the full cohort of eighth graders in three middle 
schools to participate in STJ or school as usual. Data were collected prior to 
the intervention as a baseline in the beginning of the school year and postint-
ervention at multiple points in time (end of the eighth grade, fall and spring of 
the ninth grade) as children dispersed from the three middle schools to high 
schools across the city and beyond.
STJ began in the fall (mid-September) and ended 7 weeks later, in mid-
November, prior to the completion of the first report card marking period. 
Control youth attended their regularly scheduled classes; intervention youth 
received the 11-session intervention twice weekly. The intervention was fully 
manualized. Fidelity to protocol was maintained via in vivo ratings by trained 
observers and weekly staff meetings (see Oyserman, Bybee, et al., 2006). 
Across the three schools, average attendance for the 11 sessions ranged from 
80% to 90% by school, with only 36 youths assigned to STJ failing to attend 
at least half of the 11 sessions. In these 13.6% of intervention group cases, the 
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youths were not attending school (often due to suspension or a move to another 
school). Evaluation first determined that trainers and students had engaged in 
the manual-directed activities and that the predicted content had emerged in 
sessions. Having clarified that the planned process was followed, the impact 
of the intervention on children’s grades, behavior in class, attendance, stan-
dardized test scores, self-report of depressive symptoms, and identity were 
assessed (Oyserman, Bybee et al., 2006).
Results. To evaluate outcomes, control and intervention students were 
tracked through 2 academic years: the final year of middle school and the 
first year of high school. The STJ intervention had significant direct effects, 
increasing the number of school-focused possible identities students reported 
(d   0.30) and linking them with strategies (d   0.32). Effects for behavior 
were found both at the end of the school year and over time. For example, at 
2-year follow-up, significant effects on academic outcomes were found. 
Effects were found on all measures obtained—time spent doing homework 
(d   0.74), change in in-class disruptiveness (d   0.78), change in time spent 
doing homework (d   1.04), grades (d   0.30), change in grades (d   0.35), 
unexcused absences taken from school records (d   –0.30), in-class initiative 
taking (d   0.33), change in initiative taking (d   0.43) and disruptiveness 
(d   –0.33) by teacher report. The STJ intervention also reduced 2-year 
follow-up risk of depression (youth reported) (d   –0.26). Importantly, 
effects on academic and behavioral outcomes were mediated by change in 
possible identities and increased linkage between possible identities and strat-
egies to attain them. Moreover, participation in the STJ intervention buffered 
youth from the negative effects of low parent involvement in school (Oyser-
man, Brickman, Rhodes, 2007). Children were randomly assigned to inter-
vention and began at the same level of grades, attendance and behavior 
problems. Over time, in the control group, low parent involvement in school 
was associated with dropping grades and attendance and worse behavior. 
Children in STJ were protected from these negative consequences perhaps 
because STJ, like parent school involvement, communicates to children that 
succeeding in school is a possible identity, congruent with other social identi-
ties, and that difficulty just means that school success is a goal worth 
pursuing.
Summary. Taken together, the STJ intervention and accompanying research 
underscored a number of basic points. First, people are motivated to act in 
identity-congruent ways. Second, what an identity means in context is a 
dynamic function of the pragmatic options for action in a particular situation 
and how these options are imbued with identity-based meaning. Third, subtle 
shifts in contexts including shifts resulting from small interventions can have 
big effects on outcomes when they instantiate identity-behavior links. In this 
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way, the identity-based motivation conceptualization does not imply a fixed 
or stable relationship between racial-ethnic identity and engagement or dis-
engagement from school. Rather than propose that a salient but stigma-
tized racial or ethnic identity (e.g., African American) stably undermines 
(e.g., Fordham & Ogbu, 1986; Steele, 1997) or enhances (e.g., Lew, 2006) 
academic attainment, the IBM approach proposed that people are motivated to 
act in identity-congruent ways but that what determines if a racial or ethnic 
identity feels congruent (or incongruent) with school engagement is the mean-
ing it takes on in context. The results of the IBM-based studies summarized 
above suggest first that racial and ethnic identities are unlikely to predict 
improved academic attainment unless these identities explicitly link race-
ethnicity to academics and second that content of racial and ethnic identities 
are likely to change as context changes. The IBM-based prediction is children 
are motivated to engage in identity-congruent behavior and are highly sensi-
tive to cues as to which behaviors are identity congruent. In context, they may 
or may not engage in school-focused behavior depending on which behaviors 
feel identity congruent.
Implications of IBM for Counseling Psychology
In this article, we outlined the IBM model, which assigns a central role to 
identity as it is dynamically constructed in context. Briefly, according to the 
IBM model, the self-concept includes a variety of social and personal iden-
tities (past-, present-, and future-focused) that are not well integrated. 
Identities matter because they influence what actions people take (action 
readiness) and how they make sense of the world (procedural readiness). 
Although a particular identity feels important and stable in the moment, even 
seemingly important and stable identities are highly malleable and context 
sensitive. People are unlikely to be aware of either the situational influences 
on their identities or the important downstream consequences of this situa-
tional influence on which identities are salient or on what an identity means 
in the moment. Therefore, they are likely to be unaware of the influence of 
situations on identity-cued thought and action processes. Given this lack of 
awareness, IBM processes can be beneficial (goal supporting) or detrimental 
(goal undermining) depending on how an identity is constructed in a specific 
context and the behavioral and procedural options available in that context. 
Therefore, it is not possible to understand the influence of an identity on 
cognition and behavior without taking situations into account.
In terms of the relationship between identity and school attainment, 
whether identity-based meaning making and action readiness has positive or 
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negative effects on school-focused behavior depends on which identities are 
cued and how experienced difficulty in working toward goals is interpreted. 
Given the high proportion of children who report expecting to go to college 
(e.g., Trusty, 2000), the IBM model takes as a starting point that children 
want to succeed academically but that their academic attainment is likely to 
fall short of their academic aspiration for a number of reasons. First, engag-
ing in effortful school-focused behavior is contingent on which identities are 
salient in context. Second, contextual cues also influence whether salient 
identities are linked to school-focused behavior in the moment. Last, contex-
tual cues influence whether experienced difficulty is interpreted as meaning 
that the goal of school success is important and so should be worked on or 
blocked and impossible to attain and so should be abandoned. Though highly 
contextualized, identities still can be harnessed to improve motivation.
The IBM perspective highlights the ability of small interventions to have 
large effects if interventions focus on changing which identities are salient, 
what salient identities mean, and how difficulty is interpreted. The STJ inter-
vention is an example of such an intervention (Oyserman et al., 2002; 
Oyserman, Bybee, et al., 2006). The intervention operationalized three key 
propositions of IBM (action readiness, dynamic construction, interpretation 
of difficulty). It helped students become more sensitive to contextual cues rel-
evant to school-focused current and possible identities, see school-focused 
identities as congruent with other important identities (e.g., race-ethnicity, gen-
der, social class), and interpret difficulty as importance. That is, the experience 
of difficulty in working on school outcomes was framed as meaning that the 
goal was important, not impossible, for people like oneself. The intervention 
was tested twice and demonstrated to boost academic outcomes; moreover, 
these effects were mediated by change in children’s future-focused identities 
and the perceived connection between these identities and other important 
identities (Oyserman et al., 2002; Oyserman, Bybee et al., 2006).
For a number of reasons, the IBM model provides a uniquely fitting theo-
retical basis for counseling psychology. By focusing on harnessing moti-
vation in the micro–macro interface, it leverages elements of theoretical 
perspectives currently used by counseling psychology. First, contemporary 
counseling psychology prioritizes person-in-context and developmental-
contextual theoretical perspectives that emphasize the bidirectional interac-
tion between a person and the environment to promote health, achievement, 
and career development (Betz & Fitzgerald, 1993; Gelso & Fassinger, 1990; 
Kenny, Waldo, Warter, & Barton, 2002; Solberg et al., 2002; Vondracek & 
Profeli, 2002). The IBM model builds from a person and environment inter-
action model to show how subtle situational cues shape which identities 
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come to mind and what they mean in the moment. The IBM model is congru-
ent with other programs described in the counseling literature that have not 
been empirically evaluated for effects on academic outcomes (e.g., the Tools 
for Tomorrow program; see Solberg et al., 2002). As described earlier, the 
STJ program based on the IBM model has been evaluated twice (as an after-
school program and as an in-school program). In both cases, significant 
effects were found on academic outcomes as well as on the predicted mediat-
ing variables (school-focused future identities).
Second, congruent with counseling psychology’s focus on lifespan devel-
opment of the whole person and healthy personality (Kenny et al., 2002), 
the identity-based motivation model demonstrates how a large aspiration–
attainment gap can develop over time simply because contexts subtly or 
implicitly cue some identities more than others or cue some identity-to-
behavior links over others. Third, congruent with counseling psychology’s 
emphasis on both risk and resilience factors (Kenny et al., 2002), the IBM 
model demonstrates how brief interventions that highlight structural barriers 
and personal strengths can produce positive consequences for youth develop-
ment over time and in real-world settings for individuals varying in gender, 
racial-ethnic, social-class, and cultural backgrounds. The identity-based moti-
vation model is also useful for predicting when risky rather than healthy 
choices will be made in other domains such as health (Oyserman et al., 2007).
Third, the translation of IBM into the rigorously tested STJ intervention 
provides support for curricula of several school-based counseling psychology 
interventions that have been evaluated only preliminarily. In each case, 
activities focus on the future self and self-goals as well as challenges and 
options (e.g., the Achieving Success Identity Pathway, Tools for Tomorrow, 
and Career Institute; see Howard & Solberg, 2006; Rivera & Schaefer, 2008; 
Solberg et al., 2002). Moreover, the IBM model highlights the interface of 
micro- and macro-structural issues and the potential for leveraging small 
interventions and situational cues. Thus the IBM-based intervention model 
complements larger school-change interventions that use systemic, full-
service models to restructure in and out of school services, incorporate com-
munity partnerships, and develop individualized plans for youth to transform 
the student experience (e.g., Gardner Extended School Service and Teachers 
Supporting Students; see Kenny et al., 2002; Walsh & Galassi, 2002). Last, 
IBM interventions such as STJ complement rather than conflict with policy-
based and large-scale interventions that attempt to combat structural inequal-
ity with a focus on economic asset building (Grinstein-Weiss et al., 2009), 
school reform, or teacher training.
 at UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN on September 10, 2010tcp.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Oyserman and Destin 1033
The IBM model also highlights issues to be examined and problems to be 
avoided in implementation. For example, it uniquely highlights the need to 
provide an interpretation of difficulty as importance rather than as a cue to 
disengage. It also highlights the bidirectional relationship between identity 
and behavior. Thus, salient identities cue behavioral choices, but choices feel 
more meaningful if they feel identity based. This means both that people 
search among choices for the ones that feel more identity based and also that 
changes in behavior are more likely to be lasting if they feel identity based. 
An intervention that produces change in behavior—for example, changing 
a child’s in-class behavior by increasing on-task and decreasing off-task 
behaviors—is more likely to fade over time if these behaviors are not incor-
porated as identity based. When these behaviors feel identity based, then they 
will come to mind whenever the identity (being a boy, being Latino) comes 
to mind.
The IBM model also suggests that identity-congruent choices are more 
likely than identity-incongruent choices and that identity congruence is sepa-
rate from an analysis of other benefits or costs the behavior may have. People 
want to act like in-group members and do not want to act like out-group 
members (e.g., Berger & Heath, 2007). However, what an identity means and 
which behaviors feel congruent with it is highly malleable. What feels like 
identity-congruent or identity-incongruent behavior in the moment is based 
in felt similarity between the choice and in-group “me” identities versus out-
group “not me” identities. Whether the behavior feels similar to in-group or 
to out-group depends on subtle contextual cues. Counseling psychologists 
can work to modify context-based implicit messages that may dampen 
accessibility of possible identities or imply that difficulty is best interpreted 
to mean that the path to these identities is blocked so as to facilitate career 
development and health across racial-ethnic and cultural divides.
The IBM model clarifies that identity-congruent behaviors are preferred 
and that this preference is independent of any evaluative judgment about the 
value of the behavior. Once a behavior is identity congruent, it becomes what 
“we” do, separate from utilitarian concerns about whether it is a good or use-
ful thing to do. Just as one’s in-group may have negative attributes or make 
poor choices but these choices and attributes are still in-group defining, 
choices can be congruent with one’s personal identities even if they are nega-
tively evaluated.
Finally, it should be noted that the IBM model interfaces well with other 
theoretical perspectives such as Steele’s (1997) stereotype threat model, 
Dweck’s (2002) models of intelligence, and models of racial and ethnic iden-
tity other than our own (e.g., Cross’ s model; see Worrell, Vandiver, Schaefer, 
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Cross, & Fhagen-Smith, 2006). The stereotype threat model predicts a main 
effect of making salient a stereotype about one’s group; in contrast, the IBM 
model predicts that this effect will be moderated by content of identity such 
that a threat effect should not be found if counterstereotypic identity content 
is cued (for empirical support for this model, see Oyserman et al., 2003). The 
models of intelligence framework predicts a main effect of believing that 
intelligence is malleable, but the IBM model predicts that the effect will be 
moderated by what interpretation children have of the difficulties they encoun-
ter in doing school work. Cross’ racial-identity model began as a develop-
mental model and was revised to focus on describing content of identity in 
terms of six internally consistent subscales (Assimilation, Miseducation, 
Self-Hatred, Anti-White, Afrocentricity, Multiculturalist Inclusive) that relate 
to experience in the social world in the sense that encounters with racism 
influence how one considers one’s racial identity (see Worrell & Watson, 
2008). Cross’s model (see Worrell, Vandiver, Schaefer, Cross, & Fhagen-
Smith, 2006) centralizes the influence of direct experience with racism. This 
is not incongruent with an IBM approach, but the IBM model makes predic-
tions about action readiness, dynamic construction, and interpretation of dif-
ficulty that go beyond a particular description of identity content.
Clearly, future research testing specific predictions from each model is 
needed. Moreover, future research is needed to specifically test the extent that 
teachers, parents, and community members could benefit from IBM-based 
interventions aimed at increasing engagement in the kinds of behaviors likely 
to improve children’s school outcomes. Brief interventions that link relevant 
behaviors with identities as committed students, parents, and teachers and that 
provide an interpretation of difficulty as importance should increase the effec-
tiveness of larger interventions (e.g., to support early parenting, improve 
teaching, or save for the future).
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Notes
1. Racial, ethnic, gender, and social-class identities are often multiply constructed 
such that one’s racial identity is likely to refer to the interface of gender, social 
class, race, and ethnicity that defines the specific constellation relevant to oneself. 
In this article we refer to racial-ethnic identity rather than to racial and ethnic iden-
tities separately for this reason. Whereas we sometimes refer separately to racial-
ethnic and gender identities, and these can be separately cued, we assume that what 
comes to mind is often a gendered, racial-ethnic identity tied to a particular time 
and place.
2. For examples focused on the social identity of being African American, see Cross, 
Smith, and Payne, 2002, and Strauss and Cross, 2005.
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